### Race []

#### Turn – our ethic resolves the negative impacts of racism, cross apply our Weston evidence, he specifically talks about how an ethic that values more than our human selves will lead to a better society “where collective understandings are negotiated rather than devised and imposed**”** **AND** **“**speak of the human relation to nature in terms of negotiation and covenant rather than the philosophical unilateralism we have learned**”**

#### We solve the K – Kochi specifically says anthropocentrism underscores racism

#### Race and class are insufficient explanations for injustice in the context of Mexico

Carruthers 7 (David V. Carruthers; “Environmental justice and the politics of energy on the US–Mexico border”; Environmental Politics Volume 16, Issue 3, 2007; pages 394-413; KDUB)

Consider race. Environmental justice appeared in the US as an extension of civil rights struggles into environmental health; the environmental justice movement built directly on that rhetoric, organisational experience, and those institutions. If we think of environmental justice in such strict terms, only in parts of the Caribbean and Brazil might we find a comparable legacy of slavery, segregation, and racial struggle. Yet race-based struggles for rights and citizenship have been present across centuries of Latin American history. Latin America’s indigenous people face some of the region’s most egregious social and environmental inequities, though the fusion of environmental and justice concerns takes very different forms around the region. We should also not expect the geographic and socioeconomic assertions of US-styled environmental justice to hold in other contexts. US analysts confirm the disproportionate siting of industrial hazards in minority communities by mapping the hazards over race or income data. Yet in urban northern Mexico, we do not find clear correlations between poverty or ethnicity and environmental risk. Industrial hazards are widely distributed throughout the metropolitan zones and outskirts, and risks faced by lower and working class residents are not consistently greater than those faced by the middle or even upper middle classes. While we often find higher risks facing the poorest, most recent immigrants, that is more typically a function of urban growth patterns that produce squatter settlements near factories; it is not a counterpart to policy choices that deliberately impose hazards on minority communities – what David Pellow calls the ‘perpetrator–victim scenario’ (2000b)

### 2AC EE WM (K shit)

We meet the status quo conceptualizes the treaty as ECONOMIC, our affirmative ENGAGES that conceptualization

#### Counter Interp Engagement requires offering positive incentives

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

#### That means we’re T

Haass and O’Sullivan 2k– American diplomat, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State, advisor to Colin Powell, US Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan / former deputy national security advisor on Iraq and Afghanistan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of Practice of International Affairs and senior fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard N. and Meghan L., “f Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Brooking Institute, 2000; < http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>)//Beddow

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation. Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid. 3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding non- governmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

Limits – their definition overlimits and impacts education where one advantage is static

Ground – Our interp solves predictable ground by allowing the neg a stable locus of links

Default to exclusive definitions they provide the best brightline

Their def arbitrarily excludes the aff

Lit checks - we have lit contextually defining econ engagement including our aff

Potential abuse is not a voter

Reasonability avoids infinite regress

### 2AC – Wilderson

#### Wilderson presents a naïve and undifferentiated view of racial relations in the US. The neg’s understanding of structural antagonism destroys the possibility for engaging the complexities necessary to tackle whiteness.

**Janani 2013**

“What's Wrong With the Term 'Person of Color',” <http://blackgirldangerous.org/new-blog/2013/3/21/whats-wrong-with-the-term-person-of-color/>

Black cultural theorist Frank Wilderson's Red, White, and Black argues that early US America was constructed in a racial triangle of Settler/Savage/Slave. White people, White men really, claimed this land and because they were able to use Black bodies for slave labor, they were able to launch a genocide on Indigenous peoples. That is, the dehumanization and exploitation of Black people scaffolded the erasure of Native peoples. This was the racial order set in place in the early formation of the US as a White supremacist state. This model leaves a whole lot of us out, of course. API folks, Latinos, Middle Eastern folks, and many more of us don't fit into that racial triangle. We're not White, and we bring our own histories of colonization. Many of us were colonized by the US itself, and White people have supremacy over all of us in various and different ways. But the fact is our land and resources were not stolen from us in this space and our ancestors were not brought here as slaves (with some important exceptions). That place-based specificity is what the term 'person of color' doesn't deal with adequately. As an identifier, 'person of color' can be slippery for a lot of politicized, non-Black, non-indigenous, non-White people in the US, for 2 reasons: 1) US/Western imperialism is so widespread that it even imposes its ways of doing racism on the rest of the world, and on people of color. For example, my family is upper caste, and that caste position is partly what enabled our immigration to the US. It also means that we're lighter-skinned South Asians (read: closer to Aryan British colonizers). Using the term 'POC' as my identifier rather than 'South Asian' or 'Desi' means I never unpack these non-Western racial systems that are also at play. 2) Many of our communities have benefited variously from racism. South Asian communities I've been involved in use antiblack racism as one strategy of assimilation. Because as White people have established, the easiest way to shore up your racial supremacy is to be antiblack, displayed in everything from microaggressions to employment discrimination to violence. We know that people of color can be racist towards each other. What I'm saying is that many of us also reap systematic advantages from the racist attitudes and structures that are held by our entire communities. How do we, as politicized people of color, acknowledge the very limits of the term 'people of color' and the way it can mask our actual racial situations? For example, why do we keep using the phrase 'communities of color' as targets of police and state violence when we primarily mean Black and Latino folks? What races are we trying to contain in the word 'brown'? Why are we afraid to point to the specificities of racism? Do we think it will divide us? Do we think we are really not capable of understanding and working from the different ways we experience racism? As long as the vocabularies of our struggle derive from the homogenizing actions of White supremacy, we will be that much farther from racial liberation.

#### Anti-blackness cannot explain orientalist violence against Islam which preceded the Enlightenment

Charoenying (citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Prof of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley) 8

(Timothy, Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach, http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach)

The year 1492 marked a major  turning point in the trajectory of Western Civilization. Elementary age children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalus–a Moorish province on the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlier–and more importantly, the last major Muslim stronghold on the European continent. Critical race scholars have argued that these two events would not only shift the geopolitical balance of power from the Orient to the Occident, but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and racial identity. According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley, the expulsion of the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age of imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of European colonial expansion throughout the known world. The “discovery” of “godless” natives in the Americas would also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in 1550 on the nature of the human soul. Such a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religous—and ultimately racial—differences. Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks, but rather, is an amalgam of old-world

Islamophobia linked to the history of the Iberian Peninsula, and to the notion of soulless beings embodied in popular conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

#### Orientalist Otherization creates a dyad between faiths, making genocidal violence inevitable

Batur, 7 (Pinar Batur, Professor of Sociology and Director of Environmental Studies at Vassar College; “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” 2007, “Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations,” “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide”)

Albert Memmi argued that “We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as a result of it”(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (Huntington 1993: 22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.”

Exclusive focus on blackness fails

**Perea 97** (Juan F. Perea – Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago, 10/31/97, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal Science of American Racial Thought”, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=californialawreview) //MD

One might object that I am distorting history by suggesting that slavery and the experience of Black Americans has not been of central importance in the formation of American society. I believe this objection misunderstands my argument. There can be no question, I think, that slavery and the mistreatment of Blacks in the United States were crucial building blocks of American society. 24 The fact that the text of the Constitution protects slavery in so many places demonstrates the importance of slavery in the foundation of the country.2 5 The constitutional, statutory and judicial attempts to create more equality for Blacks, imperfect as these all have been, correspond to the history of mistreatment of Blacks. My argument is not that this history should not be an important focus of racial studies. Rather, my argument is that the exclusive focus on the development of equality doctrines based solely on the experience of Blacks, and the exclusive focus of most scholarship on the Black-White relationship, constitutes a paradigm which obscures and prevents the understanding of other forms of inequality, those experienced by non-White, non-Black Americans. The Black/White binary paradigm, by defining only Blacks and Whites as relevant participants in civil rights discourse and struggle, tends to produce and promote the exclusion of other racialized peoples, i

ncluding Latinos/as, Asian Americans and Native Americans, from this crucial discourse which affects us all. This exclusion is both the power and the stricture of the Black/White binary paradigm. Its power derives from the fact that a limited subject of inquiry makes possible the study of the Black-White relationship in extraordinary detail and with great insight. Its stricture, however, is that it has limited severely our understanding of how White racism operates with particularity against other racialized peoples. Furthermore, the binary paradigm renders the particular histories of other racialized peoples irrelevant to an understanding of the only racism-White racism against Blacks-that the paradigm defines to be important. This perceived irrelevance is why the history of Latinos/as, Asian Americans, and Native Americans is so frequently missing from the texts that structure our thinking about race.

Wilderson’s ontology makes fatalism inevitable and offers no alt

Bâ, 11 (teaches film at Portsmouth University (UK). He researches ‘race’, the ‘postcolonial’, diaspora, the transnational and film ‘genre’, African and Caribbean cinemas and film festivals)

(Saër Maty, The US Decentred, Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### Turns the K – greatest comparative threat

Miah quoting West in 94

(Malik Miah, Cornel West's Race Matters, May-June, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3079)

In the chapter, “Nihilism in Black America,” West observes “The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the most basic issue now facing Black America: the nihilistic threat to its very existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness -- though economic well-being and political clout are requisites for meaningful Black progress. It is primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in Black America.” (12-13) “Nihilism,” he continues, “is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine ... it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” (14) “Nihilism is not new in Black America. . . . In fact,” West explains,” the major enemy of Black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilistic Threat -- that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long as hope remains and meaning is preserved, the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive. The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there can be no struggle.” (14-15)

#### Wilderson’s logic of social death replicates the violence of the middle passage – rejection is necessary to honor the dead

Brown, 9 (Vincent Brown, professor of history and of African and African American Studies specializing in Atlantic Slavery; “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

But this was not the emphasis of Patterson’s argument. As a result, those he has inspired have often conflated his exposition of slaveholding ideology with a description of the actual condition of the enslaved. Seen as a state of being, the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery. If studies of slavery would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved as an important part of that history, scholars would do better to keep in view the struggle against alienation rather than alienation itself. To see social death as a productive peril entails a subtle but significant shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which enslaved Africans and their descendants never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration. In part, the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life? For too long, debates about whether there were black families took precedence over discussions of how such families were formed; disputes about whether African culture had “survived” in the Americas overwhelmed discussions of how particular practices mediated slaves’ attempts to survive; and scholars felt compelled to prioritize the documentation of resistance over the examination of political strife in its myriad forms. But of course, because slaves’ social and political life grew directly out of the violence and dislocation of Atlantic slavery, these are false choices. And we may not even have to choose between tragic and romantic modes of storytelling, for history tinged with romance may offer the truest acknowledgment of the tragedy confronted by the enslaved: it took heroic effort for them to make social lives. There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories about how the endeavors of the weakest and most abject have at times reshaped the world. The history of their social and political lives lies between resistance and oblivion, not in the nature of their condition but in their continuous struggles to remake it. Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us.

#### Black social death theory ignores the plurality of life affirming possibilities available even to the fungible body and fails to explain the oppression of other groups

**Bales, 5** (Kevin Bales, co-founder of Free the Slaves, PhD in economics at the London School of Economics, MA in sociology from the University of Mississippi, “Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader,” p56-7)

The concept of social death highlights the essentialism and totality of enslavement, but it begs certain questions. The effect of enslavement on the life of the slave shares certain characteristics with the effect of immersion on the lives of inmates in total institutions, such as concentration camps. Elie Wiesel, for example, discussed the resocialization of inmates of Nazi concentration camps: the dissolution of their personalities, the fading from memory of their previous lives, the invention of a new being tailored to the demands and context of the camp.47 Like slavery, life in a concentration camp was a state marked by the loss of autonomy, a lack of free will, and subjugation to extreme and violent control. But could inmates in such camps be said to be socially dead? Slavery is, after all, a social and economic relationship between (at least) two people. It may be marked by an extreme imbalance of power, by ongoing exploitation, and by the potential for violence, but it remains a relationship understood and recognized (if not agreed to) by both parties. From historical slavery comes extensive accounts of the interdependence of slaves and masters and of the sometimes rich and caring relationships that grew between them.48 In Mauritania in 1997, David Hecht found an Afro-Mauritanian walking hand in hand with a White Moor dressed in matching robes. They told him that they were master and slave as well as best friends.49 It may be that the concept of social death works best when social life is defined as existing in a state of autonomy and free will, but autonomy varies enormously in human relationships. Slavery may occupy one end of the continuum, a relationship marked by the least amount of autonomy, but it remains a social relationship. Two other factors prompt questions about the concept of social death. The first is the difference in psychological and social adjustments to enslavement by people of different ages. Having interviewed a number of slaves, I find it worth noting that those who have been enslaved from a very early age often show an acceptance of slavery and a willingness to define themselves in relation to their masters. They tend to have a clear idea of their location in the social universe, as “belonging” to a certain family or individual slaveholder. Yet the state holds within itself a social and personal history, one that the slaves will easily recount when asked. For example, recall the reply given in chapter 2 by the bonded laborer in India who said, “We have always lived here. I do not know about before my grandfather, but he said we have always lived here.” People who are enslaved as adults, on the other hand, carry with them the memory of their former state. This memory often becomes the emblem of their desire for freedom. Having known some form of freedom, they are unlikely to accept a view of themselves as socially dead, but instead see themselves as abused, coerced, or controlled against their will. Given these self definitions, we can assert that neither those enslaved as children nor those enslaved as adults cease to be social beings.

### 2AC K shit

Investigating anthropocentric assumptions is uniquely key to good advocacy in educational circles because as an educator you have a role to promote education about societal narratives that legitimize anthropocentrism that’s Bell and Russel

Independently cross apply the role of the ballot argument in the 1AC this means whether we’re topical or not is a secondary question to establishing a relationship to Mexico that the 1AC does

Default to exclusive definitions they provide the best brightline

Their def arbitrarily excludes the aff – voting issue because they will always win

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### 2AC Case o/w ontology

#### Case outweighs – they contextualize ontological damnation as it only relates to humans, even if it outweighs the consequences of nuclear war it doesn’t affect biodiversity – cross apply Becker, our thinking cannot influence the way animals relate to the world

### K

Helping those suffering is key to a true meaning to our lives - Star this card.

Gruen 2009 (Lori, [Wesleyan University,](http://www.wesleyan.edu/templates/dept/phil/skeleton_faculty.htt?function=f1&department=PHIL&faculty=lgruen) Associate Professor of Philosophy, Associate Professor, Environmental Studies, Associate Professor, Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. BA University of Colorado Boulder, PHD University of Colorado Boulder. “12 Modern Philosophers” February 6th 2009, p. 233, MT)

Singer was born in 1946 in Melbourne, Australia, and still makes Melbourne home for half of each year. He was educated at Melbourne University, where he studied law, history, and philosophy. After he earned his Master’s degree in 1969, he went to Oxford where his thesis work with R. M. Hare became his first book, *Democracy and Disobedience* (1973). It was also while at Oxford that Singer began to think critically about the scope of our moral obligations and to challenge traditional notions of what matters ethically and why. Much of the furor over Singer’s philosophy stems from his criticism of sanctity-of-life views. Singer argues that not only are these views ethically problematic, but that those who claim to hold all human life as sacred do not do so consistently. He views some of those who aspouse the sanctity of human life as “hypocrites” - they appeal to the view when it suits their ends and ignore it when it doesn’t (see *The President of Good and Order*). He has also raised more than a few eyebrows because of his views about equality. For he argues that equal interests should be considered equally, whether the being that has the interests is a black man or a white woman, lives near or far away, is a teenage boy or an aging aardvark. If an individual is suffering, no matter their location or their species, their suffering must be taken into account. His arguments that the affluent are morally obligated to give to those living in poverty have lead some to question whether one can lead a meaningful life and still be ethical. Singer believes living up to our ethical obligations to attend to the suffering of others is precisely what provides meaning in our lives. Those who work to make the world a better place will know they have done something beyond themselves, and it is doing something beyond oneself that real satisfaction with one’s life can be found (see *How are we to Live*).

### 2AC perception = RC []

#### The way you relate to ecosystems is the ROOT CAUSE of all injustice and conflict – we acknowledge that utopia is impossible, but ONLY our approach provides a framework for effective ADVOCACY and PROBLEM SOLVING

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Beyond human Finally, one of the remaining border challenges of environmental justice theory is to make important connections with the environment itself. There is a reason that we discuss environmental justice – the issues involved are about how, exactly, we are immersed in the environment, and the manipulation of nature, around us. Yes, most of the discussion is about environmental bads and injustices to human beings, but the origins of environmental injustices are as much in the treatment of the nonhuman realm as in relations among human beings. The shift suggested here is one from environmental conditions as an example or manifestation of social injustice to one where justice is applied to the treatment of the environment itself. A number of analysts have made these connections. In the notion of just sustainability, Agyeman (2005) insists on a conception of environmental justice that goes beyond socio-cultural impacts alone to the interactions between social and environmental communities. Post-Katrina, many reflections have involved not only the conditions of the people in the city, but also consideration of the ecological damage done to surrounding ecosystems that have led to greater vulnerabilities for both human and non-human communities (Ross and Zepeda 2011). Sze et al. (2010) have continued their innovative work on environmental justice in the Sacramento (California) delta region by engaging this element of the socio-natural context. They see the examination of the relationship between the manipulation of nature and people for economic gain as a crucial component of an environmental justice analysis. I have been making the argument that a capabilities approach to justice is a crucial tool for addressing the relationship between environment and human needs and, potentially, the functioning of ecosystems themselves (Schlosberg 2007, 2012). A capabilities approach could enrich conceptions of environmental and climate justice by bringing recognition to the functioning of these systems, in addition to those who live within and depend on them. In this approach, the central issue continues to be the interruption of the capabilities and functioning of living systems – what keeps those living systems from transforming primary goods into the functioning, integrity, and flourishing of those that depend on them. When we interrupt, corrupt, or defile the potential functioning of ecological support systems, we do an injustice not only to human beings, but also to all of those non-humans that depend on the integrity of the system for their own functioning. It is the disruption and increasing vulnerability of the integrity of ecosystems that is at the heart of the injustice of climate change, for example, both in terms of its impact on vulnerable human communities and non-human nature

. The treatment – or abuse – of human and non-human individuals and systems is based on the same loss of the ability to function. This application of a capabilities approach to non-human nature brings both benefits and potential conflicts. The first benefit is that a focus on the needs of non-human systems would entail that human beings actually recognise the link between environmental conditions and the basic needs of both human beings and the non-human. In other words, extending a capabilities approach to non-human environments entails recognition of the value of the processes and provisions of natural systems. The second benefit is a discursive one, as a capabilities approach applied to both human and non-human can serve as a bridge between conceptions of social justice and a wide range of environmental concerns. The main problem with this approach, of course, is the potential for conflict between the capabilities and functioning of human beings and those of the natural world (Cripps 2010). Fully addressing this issue would take more space than is available here, but I would simply note that any conception of justice, as it is applied to actual issues and injustices, would entail potential conflict. One of the major problems of ideal justice theories is that they seek to eliminate the potential for conflict – at least in theory. But such theorists are mistaken to believe that the elimination of such conflict in theory makes for more harmonious application to social policy or practice. Conflicts of justice arise, whether in the human realm, or, in this example, between human beings and the nature in which they are immersed, no matter what the ideal. Actual problemsolving entails the negotiation of different conceptions of (in)justice in and across different participants, from community or stakeholder groups to corporations or states; it requires recognition, conceptions of disadvantage, and political engagement. This is where potential conflicts can be addressed, and ways of life attentive to the creation and experience of disadvantage and disabled functioning – human and non-human alike – can be negotiated and designed. One of the clear developments in the past decade, then, has been a thorough expansion of the scope of the environmental justice frame. Against the early warnings of some in the US environmental justice community that the term should remain limited to the experience of racial discrimination, my suggestion has always been that environmental justice has the potential to be an integrative and empowering framework for a variety of movements and concerns (Schlosberg 1999, 2007). Likewise, Sze and London (2008, p. 1332) have insisted that ‘instead of imposing a restrictive boundary around the concepts of environmental justice, scholarship in this emerging field should embrace its wide-ranging and integrative character’. Clearly, the trend of environmental justice in both theory and practice has been this expansion of the discourse into new spaces, and across many boundaries.

### Nietzsche []

#### The only way to solve the K by embracing the finitude of our lives and the enormousness of nature

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 73, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)

Here Rank joins Kierkegaard in the belief that one should not stop and circumscribe his life with beyonds that are near at hand, or a bit further out, or created by oneself. One should reach for the highest beyond of religion: man should cultivate the passivity of renunciation to the highest powers no matter how diffcult it is. Anything less is less than full development, even if it seems like weakness and compromise to the best thinkers. Nietzsche railed at the Judeo-Christian renunciatory morality; but as Rank said, he “overlooked the deep need in the human being for just that kind of morality… .”34 Rank goes so far as to say that the “need for a truly religious ideology … is inherent in human nature and its fulfillment is basic to any kind of social life.”35 Do Freud and others imagine that surrender to God is masochistic, that to empty oneself is demeaning? Well, answers Rank, it represents on the contrary the furthest reach of the self, the highest idealization man can achieve. It represents the fulfillment of the Agape love-expansion, the achievement of the truly creative type. Only in this way, says Rank, only by surrendering to the bigness of nature on the highest, least-fetishized level, can man conquer death. In other words, the true heroic validation of one’s life lies beyond sex, beyond the other, beyond the private religion—all these are makeshifts that pull man down or that hem him in, leaving him torn with ambiguity. Man feels inferior precisely when he lacks “true inner values in the personality,” when he is merely a reflex of something next to him and has no steadying inner gyroscope, no centering in himself. And in order to get such centering man has to look beyond the “thou,” beyond the consolations of others and of the things of this world.36

#### **Acting and assumptions are key to survival**

Nietzsche 1882 (The Gay Science, Kaufmann translation. TL)

Origin of the logical.- How did logic come into existence in man's head? Certainly out of illogic, whose realm originally must have been immense. **Innumerable beings who made inferences in a way different from ours perished**; for all that, their ways might have been truer. **Those**. for example, **who did not** know how to **find** often enough what is "equal" as regards both **nourishment and hostile animals**-those. in other words, **who subsumed things too slowly and cautiously-were favored with a lesser probability of survival than those who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that they must be equal.** The dominant tendency. however, to treat as equal what is merely similar-an illogical tendency. for **nothing is really equal**-is what ·first created any basis for logic. In order that the concept of substance could originate which is indispensable for logic although in the strictest sense nothing real corresponds to it- it was likewise necessary that for a long time one did not see nor perceive the changes in things. **The beings that did not see so precisely had an advantage over those that saw everything "in flux”.** · At bottom, every high degree of caution in making inferences and **every skeptical tendency constitute a great danger for life. No living beings would have survived if the opposite tendency-to affirm** rather than suspend judgment, to err and make up things rather than wait, to assent **rather than negate.** to pass judgment rather than be just-**had not been bred to the point where it became extraordinarily strong.** The course of logical ideas and inferences in our brain today corresponds to a process and a struggle among impulses that are, taken singly, very illogical and unjust. **We generally experience only the result of this struggle** because this primeval mechanism now runs its course so quickly and is so well concealed.

### 2AC FW

#### Our interpretation is that we get to weigh the plan against the kritik

#### Fairness – not allowing us to weigh the plan puts us at an inherent disadvantage compared to the neg

#### Education – not allowing to weigh the plan means there’s no comparative analysis – that’s an important skill we learn in debate, additionally their framework discourages topic specific research which is the most important skill we learn

#### Cross apply role of the ballot is to create a relationship towards Mexico’s environment ONLY the 1AC does that

### 2AC Lytics

#### No internal link – the plan is not responsible for all their impact, they should get to weigh as much of the impact as the plan is responsible for

#### No link –a) their authors would be hella down with nature AND b) we’re an incremental change in the right direction

#### Cross apply Hirokawa – even if our aff is not perfect we should still take action, each incremental change opens up a new context for viewing and relating to the world

#### Cross apply Kochi – we solve the kritik anthropocentrism is the root cause of their impact